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Abstract
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) explicitly embeds the concept of reasonable accom-
modation within the principle of non-discrimination. Article 2 of the CRPD unambiguously recognizes that reasonable ac-
commodation is vital in enabling persons with disabilities to enjoy and exercise their rights on an equal basis with others.
This article argues that in the ten years since its entry into force, the CRPD has stimulated a process of cross-fertilization. In
particular, it contends that the CRPD has played a crucial role in the advancement of disability equality, and in the recogni-
tion of reasonable accommodation as a gateway to the equal enjoyment of all human rights within the European human
rights system. By adopting a legal perspective and a traditional doctrinal approach, this article focuses on relevant Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. It shows the gradual adoption by the ECtHR of the concept of reasonable
accommodation as an essential element to remove specific barriers or disadvantages to which a particular disabled indi-
vidual would otherwise be subject. The primary emphasis of this short article is on the ECtHR case law and on the extent
to which it has translated the CRPD and the work of the CRPD Committee into the European human rights system.
Keywords
disability; discrimination; equality; human rights; legislation; reasonable accommodation
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Disability Equality: In Theory and Practice”, edited by Mark Priestley (University of Leeds,
UK) and Lisa Waddington (Maastricht University, The Netherlands).
© 2018 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
The legal concept of “reasonable accommodation” (or
its synonym “reasonable adjustment”)1 first appeared in
the United States. It was introduced in the US Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended the
Civil Rights Act 1964 (Jolls, 2001; Willborn, 2016) and,
shortly thereafter, in Canadian law (Banks, 2016). Origi-
nally, it defined specific solutions that the employer was
obliged to adopt in order to accommodate specific needs
related to religious practices. In 1973, the US Rehabilita-
tion Act extended the concept of reasonable accommo-
dation to the disability context. As noted byWaddington
(2011, p. 187):
The obligation to make a reasonable accommodation
on the grounds of disability is based on the recog-
nition that, on occasions, the interaction between
an individual’s impairment and the physical or social
environment can result in the inability to perform
a particular function, job or activity in the conven-
tional manner.
Lawson (2012, p. 846) highlights that the duty to provide
reasonable accommodations entails a duty to remove
barriers created by physical structures, traditional meth-
ods of communication and standard policies or practices
where these would place a person with a disability at a
disadvantage when compared with a non-disabled per-
1 The terms “reasonable accommodation” and “reasonable adjustment” are generally considered interchangeable. The term adjustement is used in
some national laws, such as e.g. the UK Equality Act 2010.
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son. Along the lines traced by the Rehabilitation Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 has intro-
duced a provision requiring employers to adopt specific
adjustments that remove the environmental and social
barriers faced by persons with disabilities2 in the work-
place (Rosen, 1991). It includes a broad prohibition of dis-
crimination on the grounds of disability and qualifies as a
discriminatory behavior the denial of reasonable accom-
modation. In 2000, the concept of reasonable accommo-
dation was incorporatedwithin European Union (EU) leg-
islation. Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Novem-
ber 2000 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation establishes
the duty of the employer to provide disabled workers
with reasonable accommodation.With the 2006UN Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD),
which entered into force in May 2008, reasonable ac-
commodation has become an integral part of the inter-
national human rights framework. The CRPD unequivo-
cally links the duty to accommodate to the principle of
equality (Broderick, 2015a, p. 107), recognizing the role
of reasonable accommodation as a gateway to the equal
enjoyment of all human rights, being they civil, political
or socio-economic rights (Lawson, 2008a, pp. 65–66).
The CRPD as a whole has experienced an unprece-
dented level of success, and, at the time of writing, it
has been ratified by 175 States across the globe as well
as by the EU. It has become the main legal benchmark
against which the appropriateness of domestic disability
laws and policies should be measured and the protec-
tion and promotion of the rights of persons with disabil-
ities should be assessed. In Europe, the CRPD has had
a significant influence on the legal discourse surround-
ing disability equality. The Court of Justice of the EU as
well as national courts have referred to the CRPD as the
key international document for the protection and pro-
motion of the rights of persons with disabilities in their
decisions. They have increasingly attempted to interpret
domestic law in a manner consistent to the CRPD (Ferri,
2014; Waddington & Lawson, 2018). The CRPD itself re-
quires States Parties to ensure full compliance with the
Convention within their domestic legal order, an obliga-
tion that even extends to their national courts. However,
and more broadly, the CRPD has stimulated a process
of cross-fertilization and has played a crucial role in the
advancement of disability equality beyond State Parties
(Ferri, 2017). It has contributed to the advancement of
the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities
within the European human rights system of the Coun-
cil of Europe, which mainly revolves around the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Strasbourg Court”)
has referred to the CRPD in almost all of the most re-
cent case law on disability. Lawson (2012, p. 847) sug-
gests that “the relevance of the CRPD in questions of in-
terpretation of the ECHR in matters relating to disability”
has been fully acknowledged by the ECtHR. Favalli (2018)
goes even further and argues that the ECtHR has recog-
nized the core provisions of the CRPD as general prin-
ciples of international law that must be complied with
when applying and implementing the ECHR.
Against this background, this article contends that
the ECtHR decisions in which the influence of the CRPD
is most relevant and obvious concern the role of reason-
able accommodation in ensuring equal rights for persons
with disabilities. By adopting a legal perspective and a
traditional doctrinal approach, this succinct article delib-
erately focuses on the ECtHR case law. It endeavors to
discuss the extent to which it has effectively translated
the CRPD and the work of the CRPD Committee into the
European human rights system. In doing so, it tallies with
previous research which argues that the CRPD has shed
a light on the significance of reasonable accommodation
as a primary tool to achieve disability equality across dif-
ferent jurisdictions (Brown& Lord, 2011; Ferri, 2017;Mé-
gret & Msipa, 2014). After this Introduction, the remain-
der of this article is divided into five sections. Building
on the broad array of literature on the topic (Broderick,
2015a, 2015b; Brown & Lord, 2011; Cera, 2017; Lawson,
2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2012, 2017), Section 2 dis-
cusses in a general fashion the role of reasonable accom-
modation in the CRPD, in light of the CRPD Committee’s
jurisprudence and general comments. Section 3 goes on
to examine in a general fashion how the concept of rea-
sonable accommodation has been incorporated into the
ECHR framework by the Strasbourg court. Sections 2 and
3 provide important context for the rest of the discussion
that is conducted in Section 4. The latter aims to highlight
the gradual adoption by the ECtHR of the concept of rea-
sonable accommodation. Section 5 concludes with brief
remarks on the role of reasonable accommodation in en-
suring disability equality.
2. Reasonable Accommodation in the CRPD
2.1. Reasonable Accommodation and Equality in the
CRPD: Setting the Scene
The CRPD is underpinned by the social model of disabil-
ity and embraces the view that “disability results from
the interaction between persons with impairments and
attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal ba-
sis with others” (UN, 2016, Preamble, lett. e). Dignity, in-
dividual autonomy, equality, accessibility and inclusion
within society and the acceptance of disability as part of
human diversity are some of the key principles around
which the CRPD revolves and that permeate the entirety
of the text. The Convention, by recasting disability as a
social construction (Stein & Lord, 2009, p. 33), focuses
2 The terms “persons with disabilities” and “disabled people” are used interchangeably throughout this article, consistently with the idea that disability
stems from the interaction between the individual impairment and social structures and systems, and in line with a social-contextual understanding
of disability.
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on the removal of barriers and provision of accommoda-
tions to ensure the equal enjoyment of rights by persons
with disabilities, and their full participation in society. Ng-
wena (2013, p. 478) affirms that the emphasis placed
by the CRPD on accommodating human diversity, provid-
ing individualized support, is “the Convention’s greatest
transformative modality”.
The concept of reasonable accommodation is a core
of feature of the CRPD, and is unequivocally incorporated
into the non-discrimination and equality principles. Arti-
cle 5(2) of the CRPD requires States Parties to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of disability. The latter is de-
fined in Article 2 of the CRPD as:
Any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis
of disability which has the purpose or effect of impair-
ing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic,
social, cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all
forms of discrimination, including denial of reason-
able accommodation. (UN, 2016)
Article 5(3) of the CRPD explicitly requires States Parties
to take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable ac-
commodation is provided. Reasonable accommodation
is clearly defined in Article 2 of the CRPD as
The necessary and appropriate modification and ad-
justments not imposing a disproportionate or undue
burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure
to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise
on an equal basis with others of all human rights and
fundamental freedoms. (UN, 2016)
Since the Convention does place reasonable accommo-
dation within the realm of non-discrimination and equal-
ity, according to the CRPD Committee, States Parties
must immediately ensure that reasonable accommoda-
tion is provided, since the duty to accommodate is
not subject to progressive realization (CRPD Committee,
2017a, para. 46).
2.2. Reasonable Accommodation as an “Incidental
Right” and as a Gateway to the Equal Enjoyment of
Human Rights
Aside from Articles 2 and 5 of the CRPD, reasonable
accommodation is mentioned explicitly in other provi-
sions of the Convention, for example in Article 24 on
the right to education and in Article 27 on the right to
work. Moreover, Article 14(2) of the CRPD explicitly rec-
ognizes that reasonable accommodations must be pro-
vided to persons with disabilities held in detention. How-
ever, as noted by Broderick (2015a, p. 155), “by virtue of
the cross-cutting nature of Articles 2 and 5 of the CRPD”
persons with disabilities are “holders of a fundamental
right to be accommodated in a variety context and by a
wide array of entities”.
It is often acknowledged that the Convention does
not create new rights. Rather, it “rewrites” human
rights within a disability context. In doing so it does in-
clude “amplified formulations of human rights” (Kayess
& French, 2008, p. 28), and creates “incidental rights”
(Harpur, 2012, p. 2) which ensure those same rights can
be fully enjoyed by persons with disabilities. Reason-
able accommodation is one of them. Insofar as it repre-
sents a right enforceable in itself, applicable to all per-
sons with disabilities, who, by virtue of Article 1(2) of the
CRPD, include:
Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellec-
tual or sensory impairments which in interaction with
various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.
(UN, 2016)
Since its early decisions, the CRPD Committee has em-
phasized that the right to be provided with reasonable
accommodation functions as a gateway to the exercise
of all other rights.3 The case of H.M. v Sweden (CRPD
Committee, 2012) is quite exemplary in this respect. Mrs.
H.M., who was suffering from a chronic disease which
had led to her being unable to walk or stand, was re-
fused planning permission to build an indoor swimming
pool next to her house for her to carry out hydrother-
apy which would alleviate the symptoms of her condi-
tion. The refusal of planning permission by the local au-
thorities was due to the fact that the local urban plan did
not allow new constructions in the area concerned. The
Swedish administrative authority, followed by the courts,
upheld the initial decision and contended that deroga-
tions from the urban plan were not permissible. Hav-
ing exhausted all domestic remedies, Mrs. H.M. lodged
a complaint with the CRPD Committee. The latter, in its
decision, focused on the interpretation of the concepts
of non-discrimination and reasonable accommodation.
In particular, the CRPD Committee acknowledged that
theMrs. H.M.’s health was of paramount concern. It also
held that access to a hydrotherapy pool in her home was
essential, as it constituted the only effective means of
protecting the right to health of the applicant. Then, the
Committee recognized that a derogation from the local
urban plan, to allow the construction of a hydrotherapy
pool, would constitute a reasonable accommodation. In
essence, it held that States Parties to the CRPD are under
the obligation to consider the particular circumstances
and needs of persons with disabilities and to accommo-
date these needs when applying domestic legislation.
The CRPD Committee has also articulated the un-
equivocal linkages between reasonable accommodation
and the fundamental principle of human dignity. In par-
3 As Lawson (2009) contends, by cutting across the full spectrum of rights–civil, political, economic, social and cultural–provided for in the CRPD, reason-
able accommodation plays a “peculiar bridging role”.
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ticular, in X v Argentina (CRPD Committee, 2014a) and in
the “Guidelines on Article 14 of the CRPD” (CRPD Com-
mittee, 2015), the Committee explicitly referred to rea-
sonable accommodation in places of detention as an es-
sential gateway for the equal protection of the dignity of
persons with disabilities. In a similar vein, in its most re-
cent General Comment No. 5 on independent living, the
Committee has highlighted the role of reasonable accom-
modation in enhancing autonomy and independence of
people with disabilities (CRPD Committee, 2017a).
Reasonable accommodation could be construed as
an “incidental right”, using the term suggested by Harpur
(2012, p. 2), in that it is essential to ensure that other
existing rights are realized. It matches a corresponding
duty to accommodate which is placed on a broad range
of stakeholders, as well as a general obligation on State
Parties to ensure the provision of reasonable accom-
modation. As pointed out by Brown and Lord (2011,
p. 279), the duty to provide reasonable accommodation
in the CRPD extends to “the State, employers, educa-
tion providers, health care providers, testing and quali-
fication bodies, providers of goods and services and pri-
vate clubs”. In essence, Article 5(3) of the CRPD requires
States Parties to ensure that all these actors “reasonably
adjust policies, practices and premises that impede the
inclusion and participation of persons with disabilities”
(UN, 2016). Additionally, Lawson (2008b, p. 32) suggests
that Article 5(3), read in conjunction with Article 8 of the
CRPD on awareness-raising, requires States Parties to en-
courage reflection and promote dialogue on the duty to
accommodate, and on all the types of measures that can
be taken.
Lawson (2012, p. 848) suggests that the individual-
oriented nature of the reasonable accommodation
obligation:
Requires duty-bearers to resist making assumptions
as to what might be most appropriate for a particular
individual and demands that instead they engage in a
dialogue with such a person about how the relevant
disadvantages might most effectively be tackled.
With specific regard to the employment context, it has
been observed that a “failure to consult and involve the
disabled person in question would also appear to sit un-
comfortably with the CRPD’s general principle of respect
for inherent dignity” (Ferri & Lawson, 2016, p. 49).
Even though the Convention gives a definition of rea-
sonable accommodation in Article 2, it does not pro-
vide specific guidance on what the incidental right to
be provided with an accommodation entails. Unsurpris-
ingly, the Convention is silent on what, in practice, con-
stitutes a reasonable accommodation and on the pro-
cedural aspects of the adoption of an accommodation.
Examples of accommodations have been put forward
by the CRPD Committee in its general comments relat-
ing to women with disabilities (CRPD Committee, 2016a)
and with regards to the educational context (CRPD Com-
mittee, 2016b). Other examples can be found in studies
or documents released by other UN bodies or agencies,
such as the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner forHumanRights (OHCHR, 2010) andby theWorld
Health Organization (WHO & World Bank, 2011). The In-
ternational Labour Organization in 2016 (ILO, 2016) has
also compiled a list of best practices in relation to reason-
able accommodations in the employment context. The
CRPD Committee has however elaborated on the con-
cept of reasonable accommodation and its meaning. It
clarified that the word “reasonable” concerns the rele-
vance and the effectiveness of the specific accommoda-
tion in removing the individual situation of disadvantage
that the person with a disability is facing, and relates to
the role of the accommodation in countering discrimina-
tion. This approach is confirmed by the CRPD Commit-
tee’s decision in Jungelin v Sweden (CRPD Committee,
2014c) and inMichael Lockrey v Australia (CRPD Commit-
tee, 2016c).
2.3. Reasonable accommodation v Accessibility
Although this analysis does not include a reflection on
the concept of accessibility and on how (and whether) it
has been translated in the ECtHR case law, it seems use-
ful to briefly trace the boundaries of “reasonable accom-
modation” by comparing and contrasting it with accessi-
bility in light of the CRPD Committee’s General Comment
No. 2 (CRPD Committee, 2014b).
Without delving into the theoretical question on
whether accessibility is a principle, a right, or a facilita-
tor of rights, the main difference between accessibility
and reasonable accommodation is that accessibility obli-
gations laid down in the CRPD are group related, while,
as discussed above, reasonable accommodation has an
individualised nature. Consequently, accessibility obliga-
tions are anticipatory in nature. The CRPD Committee
affirms that the “duty to provide accessibility is an ex
ante duty” and that States Parties therefore have “the
duty to provide accessibility before receiving an individ-
ual request to enter or use a place or service” (CRPD
Committee, 2014b, para. 25). The CRPD Committee has
also emphasized that its most fundamental character-
istic is its individualized nature. The CRPD Committee’s
“General Comment no. 2 on accessibility” (CRPD Commit-
tee, 2014b) and subsequent comments (CRPD Commit-
tee, 2016a, 2016b) explain that, by virtue of this individ-
ualized nature, the duty to provide reasonable accommo-
dation arises ex nunc, i.e., only at the moment at which
a person with a disability has need for a particular solu-
tion in a given situation. It might be argued that the duty
to accommodate arises when the duty-bearer knows or
ought to know (using the ordinary diligence) about the
disability and of the specific needs of the person with a
disability. However, the CRPD Committee has mentioned
that the duty arises from the moment a person with a
disability requires the accommodation in a given situa-
tion (CRPD Committee, 2016a, 2016b). Hence, there is
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still some ambiguity surrounding the temporal scope of
the right and the corresponding duty to accommodate.
Another key difference is that reasonable accommo-
dation obligations are subject to the limit of “undue” or
“disproportionate” burden, aswill be discussed in subsec-
tion 2.4. By contrast:
The obligation to implement accessibility is uncondi-
tional, i.e. the entity obliged to provide accessibility
may not excuse the omission to do so by referring to
the burden of providing access for persons with dis-
abilities. (CRPD Committee, 2014b, para. 25)
2.4. The “Disproportionate or Undue Burden” Limit
The right to be provided with a reasonable accommoda-
tion is not absolute (Waddington & Broderick, 2017, p.
12) and is subject to the “disproportionate or undue bur-
den” limit. This means that the denial of reasonable ac-
commodation does not constitute a discriminationwhen
the accommodation entails a disproportionate burden
on the duty bearer.
Regrettably, there is no explicit guidance in the CRPD
as to what may constitute a disproportionate burden.
In Jungelin v Sweden (CRPD Committee, 2014c) and in
Gemma Beasley v Australia (CRPD Committee, 2016d),
the CRPD Committee held that States Parties to the Con-
vention enjoy a margin of discretion when formulating
and assessing the reasonableness and proportionality of
accommodation measures. Jungelin v Sweden is partic-
ularly relevant in this respect. The complaint made to
the CRPD Committee was raised by Ms. Jungelin, a per-
son with a visual impairment. Despite the fact that she
met the required qualification for the job she had ap-
plied to, she was not hired because her potential em-
ployer’s intranet system was not accessible and could
not be adjusted to accommodate her sight impairment.
Ms. Jungelin claimed that this amounted to a denial of
reasonable accommodation, and consequently a discrim-
ination on the grounds of disability. However, her com-
plaints were rejected by the Swedish courts. Endorsing
the defense of the employer, the domestic tribunals took
the view that the cost of adjusting the computer system
would have imposed a disproportionate burden on the
employer. The CRPD Committee, with some dissenting
opinions, concluded that the Swedish courts had carried
out a thorough and well-balanced assessment of the fac-
tual circumstances at hand. The decision to deem the
accommodation requested as constituting an unreason-
able burden was therefore justified and the CRPD Com-
mittee held that there was no violation of Article 5 of the
CRPD on equality and non-discrimination. This decision
suggests that the financial cost of a requested accommo-
dation is a relevant factor in determining whether and
to what extent the duty-bearer can duly claim to be ex-
empt from the duty to accommodate.4 This approach
is confirmed by the “General Comment No. 4 on Arti-
cle 24: Right to education” which explicitly affirms that
“the availability of resources and financial implications
is recognized when assessing disproportionate burden”
(CRPD Committee, 2016b, para. 27).
The CRPD Committee has not elaborated further on
specific criteria to carry out the proportionality test, how-
ever its jurisprudence and general comments would sug-
gest that, by its very nature, reasonable accommodation
entails balancing the needs and interests of both the per-
son with a disability and the duty-bearer.
3. Equality and Reasonable Accommodation in the
ECHR: “The Feast of Stone” and the Strasbourg Judges
Within the European context, the Council of Europe,
which plays a primary role in the protection of human
rights, has not yet adopted any specific binding instru-
ment on the rights of persons with disabilities. The latter
are however protected by the European Social Charter
(ESC) and the ECHR and through various policy initiatives
(Favalli, 2018; Ferri, 2017; Seatzu, 2014). The ESC, in its re-
vised formulation, includes an article on the right of per-
sons with disabilities to independence, social integration
and participation in the life of the community. Notably,
this provision (i.e., Article 15 of the revised ESC) refers
to positivemeasures which provide persons with disabili-
ties with education and vocational training, and explicitly
mentions that States Parties must promote measures in-
tended “to adjust [the] working conditions to the needs
of the disabled”.While reasonable accommodation is not
explicitly mentioned, it does seem to be encompassed
within the generic reference to measures that facilitate
the exercise of the freedom of movement, the right to
use goods and cultural content, and the right to housing.
As noted elsewhere (Ferri, 2017), the European Commit-
tee on Social Rights has, in a few occasions, highlighted
the existence of the duty to accommodate as an integral
element of disability equality.
By contrast to the ESC, the ECHR does not contain
any express reference to disability,5 disability rights or
reasonable accommodation. However, Article 14 of the
ECHR does prohibit discrimination “on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a na-
tional minority, property, birth or other status”, and, for
the first time in Glor v Switzerland (ECtHR, 2009), the
Strasbourg court established that this provision also en-
compasses the prohibition of discrimination on the ba-
sis of disability. The case revolved around the applica-
tion of the Swiss legislation on the military-service tax,
the payment of which is required for those who decide
not to carry out military service. Swiss law provided a
twin-track system, exempting from the payment of the
4 This approach is in line with that adopted at the EU level with regards to the implementation of Article 5 of Directive 2000/78.
5 Neither disability nor persons with disabilities are mentioned in the text of the ECHR. There is only a reference to Intellectual disability in Article 5(e)
ECHR on the lawful detention of “persons of unsound mind”.
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 40–50 44
tax all those having a “major” disability (i.e., 40% physi-
cal or mental disability), but requiring the payment to all
the others declared unfit tomilitary service by virtue of a
“minor” disability. The applicant, Mr. Glor, who suffered
from diabetes was declared unsuited for military service.
Since his condition did not meet the threshold of 40%
physical or mental disability required by Swiss law, he
was required to pay the military-service exemption tax,
for not carrying his military service. Mr. Glor argued that
the disability threshold provided by Swiss law (40% phys-
ical or mental disability) was discriminatory and violated
Article 14 of the ECHR. The Strasbourg Court considered
that the Swiss authorities failed to strike a balance be-
tween the protection of the interests of the community
and respect for the rights of Mr. Glor as a person with a
disability. The ECtHR recognized that the list of grounds
of discrimination of Article 14 is not exhaustive and that
discrimination based on disability is included under the
“other status” grounds. It held that the distinction made
by the Swiss authorities between persons who were un-
fit for service and not liable to the tax in question and
persons who were unsuited but still obliged to pay it
was not justified and constituted discrimination. Favalli
(2018) highlights that, in Glor v Switzerland, the ECtHR
has also adopted a broad conceptualization of what con-
stitutes a disability in line with the CRPD. This author
suggests that such a broad conceptualization has been
upheld in subsequent decisions in which the Court has
extended the application of the non-discrimination pro-
tection under Article 14 of the ECHR to persons affected
by HIV, as a form of disability. In Kiyutin v Russia (ECtHR,
2011) the Strasbourg judges considered that the refusal
of a residence permit to Mr. Kiyutin because he was HIV-
positive constituted a discrimination prohibited by Arti-
cle 14. The ECtHR went on to affirm that a distinction
made on the grounds of an individual’s health status, in-
cluding conditions such as an HIV infection, should be
covered—either as a disability or a form thereof—by the
term “other status” listed in Article 14 of the ECHR. The
same approach has been taken in I.B. v. Greece (ECtHR,
2013), which concerned HIV-based discrimination in the
employment context. Timmer (2013) affirms that the lat-
ter case is also particularly notable in that it embraces
the social model of disability, and the role of social barri-
ers and stigma in creating discrimination and preventing
equal treatment.
As it will be further discussed in Section 4, the explicit
recognition that any discrimination based on disability is
prohibited under the ECHRgoes hand in handwith the ac-
knowledgement of the right of persons with disabilities
to be provided with reasonable accommodation. First, in
Glor, the Court incidentally observed that the Swiss au-
thorities had not taken sufficient account of Mr. Glor’s
individual circumstances, imposed on Mr. Glor the pay-
ment of the military-service tax and did not propose to
him any alternative services compatible with his disabil-
ity. Although the ECHR has not explicitly recognized a
right to obtain reasonable accommodations, the judg-
ment can be interpreted as an implicit recognition that
some formof obligation to provide reasonable accommo-
dation is included in the principle of non-discrimination
laid down in Article 14 of the ECHR (Broderick, 2015b).
The ECtHR adopted a more explicit approach in ÇǶam v
Turkey (ECtHR, 2016a). This case concerned the refusal
to enroll the applicant, a girl with a visual impairment, as
a student at the Turkish National Music Academy. Even
though Ms. Çam had demonstrated adequate ability in
playing the Turkish	lute (bağlama), she was refused ad-
mission because the music courses were not accessible
to blind people. The applicant alleged that she had been
discriminated against on account of her blindness and
complained of a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR read
in conjunction with Article 2 Protocol 1 on the right to
education. It its decision, the ECtHR held that discrimina-
tion on the grounds of disability under Article 14 ECHR
encompasses the denial of reasonable accommodations
as defined by Article 2 of the CRPD. The Strasbourg
judges stated that, by refusing to register the applicant
without accommodating her needs, the Turkish author-
ities had prevented her, without any objective justifica-
tion, from exercising her right to education.
A month after ÇǶam v Turkey, in Guberina v Croa-
tia (ECtHR, 2016b), the ECtHR elaborated further on the
concept of reasonable accommodation. The case arose
from the complaint of the father of a severely disabled
child and concerned a tax exemption on the purchase
of a home. Mr. Guberina lived in a flat located on the
third floor of an inaccessible building in Zagreb. Since his
child had found it increasingly difficult to live in the flat,
the applicant and his family decided to move to a differ-
ent and more accessible accommodation and purchase
a new flat. Mr. Guberina requested a tax exemption on
the purchase of the new property. According to Croatian
legislation, this exemption was in fact available to buyers
whomoved in order to solve their “housing needs”,when
their previous property did not possess “basic infrastruc-
tures” (i.e., did not satisfy basic hygiene and technical re-
quirements). The applicant argued that accessibility was
a feature of “basic infrastructure”, and his previous flat
did not satisfy his family’s housing needs. By contracts
the Croatian authorities decided that the applicant’s old
flat possessed all basic infrastructures features and dis-
missed his request, without taking into consideration his
son’s particular circumstances. After having exhausted
all domestic remedies, Mr. Guberina alleged the viola-
tion of Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with
Protocol 1 on the right to property. The ECtHR reaffirmed
the need to give an extensive interpretation to the con-
cept of non-discrimination on the basis of disability, in-
cluding discrimination by association. In addition, and
most notably for the purpose of this analysis, the Court
recalled the concept of reasonable accommodation as
defined in Article 2 of the CRPD and held that the Croat-
ian authorities failed to consider the specific needs of the
applicant’s disabled son. The ECtHR considered that that
the manner in which the Croatian legislation had been
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applied in practice had failed to accommodate the spe-
cific needs of the applicant, in breach of the CRPD.
4. Synergies between the CRPD and the ECHR
4.1. Reasonable Accommodation and Equality
The seeds of the acknowledgment of reasonable accom-
modation as a tool to ensure disability equality are long
standing in the European human rights system. They pre-
date Glor v Switzerland and can be found in cases dat-
ing back to the late 1990s and early 2000s (De Schut-
ter, 2005), such as Botta v Italy (ECtHR, 1998) and
Price v United Kingdom (ECtHR, 2001).6 However, only
in Glor v Switzerland, and more palpably in ÇǶam v Turkey
and Guberina v Croatia, has the ECtHR interpreted the
concept of discrimination on the grounds of disability as
encompassing the denial of reasonable accommodation.
It is not a coincidence that the importance of reasonable
accommodation in the context of the application of Ar-
ticle 14 of the ECHR has emerged after the entry into
force of the CRPD, and that, in each of these cases, the EC-
tHR refers several times and explicitly to the definition of
reasonable accommodation laid down in Article 2 of the
CRPD. In ÇǶam the Court read Article 14 of the ECHR in
the light of the CRPD and held that persons with disabil-
ities are entitled to reasonable accommodation, which
is essential:
To ensure ‘the enjoyment or exercise on an equal ba-
sis with others of all human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms’ (Article 2 of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities…). Such reasonable
accommodation helps to correct factual inequalities
which are unjustified and therefore amount to dis-
crimination. (ECtHR, 2016a, para. 65)
The Strasbourg court embraced a concept of substantive
equality that fully encompasses the duty to take account
of the needs of people with disabilities and to accom-
modate those needs accordingly. In Glor v Switzerland,
ÇǶam v Turkey and Guberina v Croatia, it places a great
emphasis on the necessity to consider the specific and
individual circumstances of persons with disabilities and
to accommodate these when applying domestic legisla-
tion. In this respect, the reasoning of the ECtHR in Gu-
berina v Croatia presents interesting similarities to the
CRPD’s Committee decision in H.M. v Sweden. In H.M.,
Swedish authorities failed to consider the specific health
situation of the applicant when denying the planning
permission, and, in Guberina, Croatian authorities did
not recognize:
The factual specificity of the applicant’s situation with
regard to the question of basic infrastructure and
technical accommodation requirements to meet the
special housing needs of his family. The domestic au-
thorities adopted an overly restrictive position on the
applicant’s particular case, by failing to take into ac-
count the specific needs of the applicant and his fam-
ily when applying the condition relating to “basic in-
frastructure requirements” to their particular case,
as opposed to other cases where elements such as
the surface area of a flat, or access to electricity, wa-
ter and other public utilities, might have suggested
adequate and sufficient basic infrastructure require-
ments. (ECtHR, 2016b, para. 86)
In both cases, national authorities should have gone be-
yond a strict interpretation of national law and acted in
a manner consistent with the CRPD.
4.2. Reasonable Accommodation as an “Incidental
Right” and as a Gateway to the Equal Enjoyment of
Human Rights
The Strasbourg judges have clearly embraced a view of
reasonable accommodation as entailing the removal of
the specific disadvantage faced by the person with a dis-
ability in order to ensure substantive equality.WhileGlor
v Switzerland is merely suggestive of a right of persons
with disabilities to be provided with reasonable accom-
modation (Broderick, 2015b, p. 15; Brown & Lord, 2011,
p. 291), ÇǶam v Turkey and Guberina v Croatia are indeed
more explicit. It can be inferred from these cases that per-
sons with disabilities have a right to reasonable accom-
modation, which is enforceable as an individual stand-
alone right within the framework of non-discrimination
and equality, even though it is contingent on the enforce-
ment of another substantive right (e.g., in ÇǶam, the right
to education).
The elaboration by the ECtHR of the right to be
provided with a reasonable accommodation is still in
its infancy. However, both the CRPD Committee and
the ECtHR conceptualize reasonable accommodation as
“quintessentially individualized”.7 This is well exemplified
by the ECtHR’s statement in Glor that recognizes “special
forms of civilian service tailored (emphasis added) to the
needs of people in the applicant’s situation are perfectly
envisageable” (ECtHR, 2009, para. 95). This approach is
6 In the latter case, as suggested by Lord & Brown (2011) and by Lawson (2012), the ECtHR acknowledged that reasonable accommodation is an essential
element to protect human dignity and prevent inhuman treatment, even though it did not place it in the realm of the equality norm. Ms Price, who
had a serious kidney condition, was sentenced to three nights in custody. During her stay in prison she was kept in inadequate cell, and she had serious
difficulties in using toilets facilities which substantially aggravated her physical condition. The ECtHR stated that the conditions in which Ms Price was
held amounted to degrading treatment, and addressed the failure to accommodate the needs of MS Price as woman with disability in a prison setting.
A similar approach has been taken in subsequent cases, such as Jasinskis v. Latvia (ECtHR, 2010) and Grimailovs v. Latvia (ECtHR, 2013b), which also cite
the CRPD. In all these cases, reasonable accommodation is considered an element inherent to the application of Article 3 of the ECHR which prohibits
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. This approach is similar to the one adopted by the CRPD Committee in X v Argentina
and sits well with the interpretation given to Article 14(2) CRPD.
7 This expression is used by Gerard Quinn (Quinn, 2007).
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confirmed by the recent case of Kacper Nowakowski v
Poland (ECtHR, 2017), in which the Court considered (to
a very limited extent and somewhat implicitly) the role of
reasonable accommodation and referred to the specific
needs of persons with disabilities. The case concerned
the rights of a Deaf father to contact his son, who also
had a hearing impairment. Mr. Nowakowski, the appli-
cant, complained that the dismissal of his request to ex-
tend contact with his son had been solely on the ground
of his disability and had been discriminatory. He alleged
the violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and
family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)
of the ECHR. The ECtHR decision focused on Article 8,
rather than on Article 14. When deciding the case, the
ECtHR examined the reasons that led national courts to
dismiss Mr. Nowakowski’s request. The Strasbourg court
highlighted that Polish courts involved the child’s mother
in the contact arrangements, since she was able to com-
municate both orally and in sign language. However, this
solution ignored the existing animosity between the par-
ents and the frequent complaints by the applicant that
the mother had attempted to obstruct contact and to
marginalise his role. The Court, considering the specific
factual situation, held that the applicant and his child
would have required more time than would be the case
in a normal situation. It stated that the dismissal of Mr.
Nowakowski’s application for extension of contactmeant
that the applicant kept his right to two hours of contact
per week in the presence of the child’s mother. The EC-
tHR went on to affirm that:
The domestic courts should have envisaged addi-
tional measures, more adapted to the specific circum-
stances of the case….(emphasis added) Having regard
to the specifics of the applicant’s situation and the
nature of his disability, the authorities were required
to implement particular measures that took due ac-
count of the applicant’s situation. The Court refers
here to the second sentence of Article 23 § 2 of the
CRPD, which provides that State Parties shall render
appropriate assistance to persons with disabilities in
the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities.
(ECtHR, 2017, para. 93)
However, similar to the CRPD’s Committee, the Stras-
bourg court has so far refrained from giving specific guid-
ance on what might constitute a reasonable accommo-
dation. In ÇǶam, the Strasbourg court affirmed:
The Court is not unaware that every child has his
or her specific educational needs, and this applies
particularly to children with disabilities. In the ed-
ucational sphere, the Court acknowledges that rea-
sonable accommodation may take a variety of forms,
whether physical or non-physical, educational or or-
ganisational, in terms of the architectural accessibility
of school buildings, teacher training, curricular adap-
tation or appropriate facilities. That being the case,
the Court emphasises that it is not its task to define
the resources to be implemented in order tomeet the
educational needs of childrenwith disabilities. The na-
tional authorities, by reason of their direct and contin-
uous contact with the vital forces of their countries,
are in principle better placed than an international
court to evaluate local needs and conditions in this re-
spect. (ECtHR, 2016a, para. 66)
Similarly, in Kacper Nowakowski v Poland the ECtHR held
that it was up to the national court to identify suitable
accommodations:
The domestic courts’ duty, in cases like the present
one, is to address the issue of what steps can be taken
to remove existing barriers and to facilitate contact be-
tween the child and the non-custodial parent. How-
ever, in the instant case they failed to consider any
means that would have assisted the applicant in over-
coming the barriers arising from his disability. (ECtHR,
2017, para. 95)
Both the CRPD Committee and the ECtHR leave States
Parties (and national authorities) with a wide margin of
appreciation in determining what kind of accommoda-
tions might be reasonable (i.e., effective in the particular
situation). Some additional indication of what might con-
stitute a reasonable accommodation within the scope
of the European human rights system could have been
provided in Bayrakcı v Turkey (ECtHR, 2016c). The case
concerned a disabled employee who alleged the lack of
suitable toilet facilities installed at his workplace. The
Court, however, declared the applicant’s complaint in-
admissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In
I.B. v Greece, the Court also missed an opportunity to
elaborate on reasonable accommodation. As noted by
Timmer (2013), the Strasbourg Court, in line with do-
mestic courts, emphasized that the applicant’s health
status had not diminished his work capacity, but care-
fully avoided considering whether reasonable accommo-
dations might be necessary for persons with HIV-related
illness to carry out their work.
Finally, the ECtHR has not yet been directly con-
fronted with procedural aspects, and has, thus far, been
unable to elaborate on the “disproportionate or undue
burden” limit. The CRPD Committee still offers limited
guidance in this respect, but, arguably, the forthcoming
General Comment No. 6 on the right of persons with dis-
abilities to equality and non-discrimination has the po-
tential to stimulate cross-fertilization between the ECHR
and the CRPD. The CRPD’s Committee has identified im-
plementation gaps with regard to Article 5 of the CRPD
and intends to clarify, among others the concept of sub-
stantive equality and the limits, processes and duties
relating to the provision of reasonable accommodation
(CRPD Committee, 2017b). It is expected that additional
synergies might occur between the CRPD Committee’s
work and the ECtHR case law.
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5. Conclusion
In 2011, Brown and Lord argued that the CRPD and
its complaint mechanism should rouse and stimulate
“the somewhat sluggish development” of the concept
of reasonable accommodation in the ECtHR and other
regional systems (Brown & Lord, 2011, p. 273). Seven
years after the release of their paper, it seems that in-
deed the CRPD and the jurisprudence of the CRPD Com-
mittee have prompted an evolution in the understand-
ing of the concept of equality and non-discrimination in
the European human rights system. As this short article
has attempted to show, the Strasbourg court case law
gradually adopted the concept of reasonable accom-
modation as set out in the CRPD. As well explained by
Waddington and Broderick (2017, p. 12), reasonable ac-
commodation “is an individualised response to the par-
ticular needs of an individual with disabilities to ensure
equal opportunities” (emphasis added), and the ECtHR
has clearly and unequivocally embraced this view. The
Strasbourg judges, by referring to the CRPD, have rec-
ognized that reasonable accommodation is an essen-
tial element in removing specific barriers or disadvan-
tages to which a particular disabled individual would
otherwise be subject. Campos Velho notes that in the
CRPD the role of reasonable accommodation is concep-
tually linked to the prevention and elimination of seg-
regation, humiliation and stigma (Campos Velho Mar-
tel, 2011, p. 103). This approach seems to have been at
least partially adopted by the ECtHR, especially in ÇǶam
and Guberina.
There is still a long way to go before the cross-cutting
application of reasonable accommodation can be as-
sured in practice. There are also several procedural as-
pects to be unveiled and explored, especially when it
comes to the adoption and choice of a specific accom-
modation and to the disproportionate burden limit. How-
ever, the ECtHR and the CRPD Committee will most cer-
tainly have the possibility to elaborate further on these
aspects, stimulating new synergies and convergences.
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